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Introduction
The large body of previous literature on the e¤ects of horizontal mergers on …rms' pricing policies has mainly focused on the balance between anticompetitive price (market power) e¤ects and pro-competitive merger-related e¢ ciency improvements. 1 It should be noted, however, that market power and e¢ ciencies are not the only important channels through which horizontal mergers can a¤ect the pricing policies of a merged …rm.
Particularly important is the use of the merging partners'customer information databases for price discrimination policies after the merger. An interesting variant of price discrimination is the so called behaviour-based price discrimination (henceforth BBPD), 2 which occurs when …rms have information about consumers' past behaviour and use this information to o¤er di¤erent prices to consumers with di¤erent purchasing histories. 3 The main objective of this paper is to study the interaction between horizontal mergers and price discrimination in a context where information about consumers is a key asset of the …rms in the industry. In so doing, this paper proposes and explores a new motive for horizontal mergers. In our setting, the pooling of the merging …rms'purchase history databases, through a merger, will improve the pro…tability of price discrimination and the value of each merger partner's databases. This will, in turn, promote the pro…tability of mergers.
The fact that the new Horizontal Merger Guidelines (HMGs), issued by the U.S. Antitrust Agencies on August 19, 2010, 4 include an enlarged and more detailed discussion of price discrimination constitutes an important signal that the Agencies are willing to devote more attention to the alleged e¤ects of price discrimination in their merger investigations. 5 In particular, the new HMGs identify price discrimination as an independent competitive arm, thereby suggesting that the potential for price discrimination should be a key factor in any competitive analysis of mergers. 6 As McDavid and Stock (2010, p.5) highlight, the expanded discussion of price discrimination issues in this new version of the HMGs (when compared to the previous version)
illustrates "a greater willingness on the part of the Agencies to pursue theories of competitive harm based on alleged e¤ects on narrow categories of customers that can be specially targeted for a price increase." Indeed, the new HMGs provide that " [w] hen price discrimination is feasible, adverse competitive e¤ects on targeted consumers can arise, even if such e¤ects will not arise for other consumers." (p.6) Along these lines, Shapiro (2010, p.746) highlights that "DOJ investigations often begin by asking whether there are particular types of customers who are most likely to be harmed by the merger. We often …nd that some types of customers are more vulnerable than others to adverse competitive e¤ects. We look for pre-existing price discrimination and we consider the possibility of post-merger price discrimination. ... The Guidelines are focused on whether the merger is likely to enhance market power. Price discrimination is highly relevant to this question if the merger may enhance market power over some customers but not others."
The recognition that each …rm's customer-information databases can become more valuable through the process of mergers when price discrimination is likely to occur after the merger raises a number of interesting questions. What is the impact of price discrimination on …rms' merger decisions and on merger analysis? What are the consumer and welfare e¤ects of mergers when price discrimination is feasible? Are there reasons for antitrust agencies to challenge mergers involving price discrimination? Despite the empirical relevance of the interaction between horizontal mergers and price discrimination, the literature has devoted scarce attention to this topic. 7 This paper contributes to close this gap in the literature by endogenizing the merger formation process in the context of a repeated purchase model with two periods and three …rms wherein …rms may engage in BBPD. Consumers are assumed to be heterogeneous: some consumers are captive to a given …rm and others are shoppers in the sense that they consider competing …rms' products as perfect substitutes and are, therefore, price-sensitive consumers.
In the …rst period, …rms cannot distinguish a captive consumer from a shopper (although the size 6 In particular, in the new section 3 of the HMGs on "Targeted Customers and Price Discrimination", it is stated that "[w]hen examining possible adverse competitive e¤ects from a merger, the Agencies consider whether those e¤ects vary signi…cantly for di¤erent customers purchasing the same or similar products. Such di¤erential impacts are possible when sellers can discriminate, e.g., by pro…tably raising price to certain targeted customers but not to others." 7 Two noteworthy exceptions are Reitzes and Levy (1995) 3 of each customer segment is common knowledge to all …rms in the industry). Thus, oligopolists necessarily compete in uniform prices. In the second period, however, if price discrimination is permitted, …rms can condition prices on observed purchase histories. In particular, they can di¤erentiate between the prices they charge to customers with whom they have established a customer relationship and the prices by which they try to attract new consumers. We also assume that, in the beginning of the second period, i.e. before price competition takes place for the second time, a two-…rm merger may occur allowing the merging parties to join their customer-information databases.
Within this theoretical framework, some novel results are obtained. First, if …rms are not allowed to merge but price discrimination is permitted, then, in the second-period pricing game, all …rms end up earning the same pro…t regardless of having or not gained access to the required information to engage in price discrimination. 8 This is because, in the second period of the game, discriminating …rms will compete very …ercely for shoppers and, as a result, end up not making extra pro…ts in this segment of the market. 9 This result should be compared with Esteves (2009a) , who, for the two-…rm case, shows that price discrimination boosts both the discriminating and the non-discriminating …rm's second period pro…t. Hence, by relaxing the standard assumption that there are only two …rms in the industry, the model proposed in this paper yields new economic insights which contrast with previous results in the literature. 10 Second, if instead mergers are possible it follows that: (i) a merger will only occur in equilibrium in case price discrimination is permitted; (ii) the equilibrium merger con…guration is unique; and (iii) the merger will involve the two …rms with information to price discriminate in the second-period pricing game. In addition, even though, in equilibrium, this merger gives rise to signi…cant increases in pro…ts for the merging …rms, the …rm which is excluded from participation in the merger (the non-discriminating outsider …rm) is not a¤ected (ex-post) by the merger in terms of pro…ts. This result then eliminates the so called 'free-riding problem'identi…ed by 8 The …rm charging the lowest price in the …rst period of the game ends up selling not only to its captive consumers, but also to the entire group of shoppers. Hence, it learns nothing useful for price discrimination and is, thus, forced to sell at a single price in the second period of the game. In contrast, the remaining two …rms sell only to their captive consumers in the …rst period and, therefore, by being able to recognize these captive consumers, will have the required information to engage in price discrimination in the subsequent period of the game. 9 When there are three or more …rms in the market, then, in the second period, prices are set at the marginal cost level for shoppers whereas captive consumers are charged the monopoly (reservation) price.
1 0 As Chen (2005) highlighted in a report on the pros and cons of price discrimination, an important extension of the existing models of BBPD is to allow for more than two …rms. 4 the previous horizontal mergers literature (e.g. Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983)). 11;12 In the present paper, an important role of the merger is to eliminate competition between price discriminators for shoppers. By pooling the merging partners'customer-information databases, the merger increases the value of this information to each merger partner since the merger entity will then be able to fully separate its (aggregate) segment of locked in customers from the segment of shoppers that bought from the outsider before and to price di¤erently accordingly.
Moreover, while the merged …rm has information to engage in BBPD, the outsider has not. Thus, the merged entity is able to entice some of the rival's previous customers to switch, without damaging the pro…t from its locked in segment, whereas the outsider …rm cannot protect its previous customers from price cuts. This then softens the outsider …rm's pricing behaviour and boosts the merged …rm's pro…ts from poached customers.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, we show that the equilibrium merger will increase industry pro…ts at the expense of consumers' surplus, leaving total welfare una¤ ected. Our results, thus, carry an important merger policy implication: irrespective of the welfare standard adopted by competition authorities to appraise a proposed merger, 13 they should scrutinize the mergers in industries wherein …rms are expected to engage in BBPD with greater zeal. This paper is mainly related to two strands in the literature. It is related to the literature on endogenous horizontal mergers since we explicitly model the merger formation process by making use of the coalition formation game which was …rst proposed by Hart and Kurz (1983) . 14 In particular, at the beginning of the second period, each of the three …rms in the market simultaneously announces a list of players (including itself) that it wishes to form a coalition with. Firms that make exactly the same announcement then form a coalition together (i.e., merge). 15 The paper is also related to the stream of research on competitive BBPD where …rms engage 1 1 See also Rothschild et al. (2000) and Reitzes and Levy (1995) , for spatial models with price discrimination wherein the gains from merger participants exceed those of the outsider …rms. 1 2 It should be highlighted, however, that even though the static version of the 'free-riding problem'identi…ed by the previous horizontal mergers literature disappears in the proposed setting, our analysis also reveals that BBPD creates a dynamic 'free-riding problem'via the race to embark in the equilibrium anticipated merger. 1 3 It should be noted, however, that the adoption of the consumers'welfare standard appears to be the current practice in the major antitrust jurisdictions. As Lyons (2002, p. 1) highlights, "most major competition authorities operate under legislation and guidelines that reject this [total surplus] standard, and no major competition authority seems to apply it consistently. Instead, they overwhelmingly focus on consumers, including industrial consumers, to the exclusion of the welfare of merging …rms." See also Pittman (2007) . 1 4 This model has, for instance, been applied by Vasconcelos (2006) to derive an upper bound to industry concentration in 'endogenous sunk cost industries' (Sutton (1991 (Sutton ( , 1998 ). 1 5 Some other important contributions in this area are Gowrisankaran (1999) , Kamien and Zang (1990) , FauliOller (2000) and Horn and Persson (2001a) , to name a few.
in price discrimination based on information about the consumers'past purchases. Like other forms of price discrimination, BBPD can have antitrust and welfare implications. While in the switching cost approach purchase history discloses information about exogenous switching costs (e.g. Chen (1997) and Taylor (2003) ), in the brand preference approach purchase history discloses information about a consumer's exogenous brand preference for a …rm (e.g. Villas-Boas (1999), Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) ). A common …nding in this literature is that BBPD tends to intensify competition and potentially bene…t consumers.
Behaviour-based pricing tends to intensify competition and reduce pro…ts in duopoly models where the market exhibits best response asymmetry, 16 There are, however, some models where …rms can bene…t from BBPD. This happens when …rms are asymmetric (e.g. Sha¤er and Zhang (2000)), …rms'targetability is imperfect and asymmetric (Chen, et al. (2001) ) and when only one of the two …rms can recognize customers and price discriminate (Chen and Zhang (2009) and Esteves (2009a) ). 17 The present paper will put forward that a change from two …rms to three …rms leads to qualitative di¤erences in the economic outcomes derived and raises issues not covered in the literature so far. For antitrust policies, our analysis suggests that behaviour-based pricing can boost industry pro…t and harm consumers when a merger involving the …rms with the necessary information to price discriminate is likely to occur.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the formal framework.
Section 3 presents two no-merger benchmark cases: (i) the case where price discrimination and mergers are not permitted; and (ii) the case where price discrimination is permitted while mergers are not allowed. Section 4 looks at the endogenous mergers game. The competitive and welfare e¤ects induced by the equilibrium merger are studied in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the merger policy implications that can be derived from our analysis. Section 7 discusses some of the limitations of the proposed model. Finally, Section 8 concludes. 1 6 Following Corts (1998), the market exhibits best response asymmetry when one …rm's "strong" market is the other's "weak"market. In BBPD models there is best-response asymmetry because each …rm regards its previous clientele as its strong market and the rival's previous customers as its weak market. 
The model
Consider a market where N = 3 …rms produce a nondurable good at a constant marginal cost which we normalize to zero without further loss of generality. There are two periods, 1 and 2. On the demand side of the market, there is a unit mass of consumers. All consumers have a common reservation value, v, and each consumer wishes to buy at most a single unit of the product in each period. Assume that each …rm has a segment of captive (price-insensitive) consumers who have a high preference for its product in the sense that they consider buying only from that …rm as long as the price at the …rm is below v: 18 The proportion of consumers captive to …rm i is given by . Thus, the total number of consumers who are captive to some …rm is 3 . The remaining consumers are shoppers (price-sensitive customers) who are indi¤erent between the …rms. Consumers in this segment have less intense preference for brands and they buy the product from the cheapest …rm, as long as the price is not above v: In a repeated interaction, price-sensitive customers might be willing to leave their previous supplier. The size of this customer segment is given by = 1 3 : In this market …rms compete only for the price sensitive consumers. As we are interested in the case where > 0; it follows that < 
Timing
In the …rst period, …rms cannot distinguish a captive consumer from a shopper (although the size of each customer segment is common knowledge to all …rms in the industry). Thus, in the absence of purchase histories, oligopolists necessarily compete in uniform prices. In the second period, however, …rms may have learnt consumers'types by observing their …rst period choices.
If price discrimination is permitted, …rms can then di¤erentiate between the prices they charge to customers with whom they have established a customer relationship and the prices by which they try to attract new consumers (those that bought from a rival before). Like in Chen and Zhang (2009) and in Esteves (2009a) a …rm will not be able to distinguish between its captive customers and shoppers if it has sold to them both in the …rst period. In that case, the …rm does not have the required information to price discriminate. In contrast, if a …rm sells to only one segment in the …rst period, then it has the required information to recognize these "old" captive customers in the second period. Consequently, the …rm can charge two prices in the 1 8 In a repeated purchase model, captive consumers cannot be poached by rival …rms. 7 second period: one for the recognized captive segment and the other for the rest of the market which is not recognized (namely for shoppers who bought from a rival before).
Henceforth, we will designate as informed, a …rm which, before a merger takes place, is endowed with a purchase history database which allows it to distinguish a captive customer from a shopper in period 2. In contrast, an uniformed …rm is one that in period 1 sold its product both to its captive consumers and to (all) price sensitive consumers. Its database then does not allow it to distinguish a captive customer from those other consumers who might be willing to switch.
In both periods, …rms set their prices simultaneously. The …rms act to maximize their pro…ts using a common discount factor 2 [0; 1] : Furthermore, consumers are assumed to be naive in the sense that they do not anticipate any poaching attempt by …rms in the future neither their incentives to merge.
Finally, we also assume that, in the beginning of the second period, i.e. before price competition takes place for the second time, a two-…rm merger may occur, allowing the merging parties to join their customer-information databases. 19 
The merger formation game
In order to determine the merger pattern, we make use of an endogenous merger model based on the coalition formation game which was …rst proposed by Hart and Kurz (1983) . In particular, each …rm i 2 f1; 2; 3g simultaneously announces a list of players (including itself) that it wishes to form a coalition with. Firms that make exactly the same announcement then form a coalition together. For example, if …rms 1 and 2 both announced coalition f1; 2; 3g, while …rm 3 announced something di¤erent (f3g or something else), then players 1 and 2 form a coalition.
In formal terms, …rm i's strategy is to choose a set of …rmsŜ i , which is a subset of the set of …rms in the industry f1; 2; 3g and includes …rm i. The set of strategies for …rm i is,
Given …rms' announcements Ŝ 1 ;Ŝ 2 ;Ŝ 3 , the resulting coalition structure is C = fC 1 ; :::; C T g, where T denotes the number of di¤ erent lists chosen by the 3 …rms. C i \ C j = ; for i 6 = j and [ T i=1 C i = f1; 2; 3g. Firms i and j belong to the same coalition C k if and only ifŜ i =Ŝ j .
Two remarks are in order at this point. First, notice thatŜ i (respectively,Ŝ j ) is the largest set of …rms …rm i (respectively, …rm j) would be willing to be associated with in the same coalition. As a result, the coalition C k may in general be di¤erent fromŜ i (respectively,Ŝ j ).
A coalition corresponds to an equivalent class, with respect to equality of strategies. Second, since in the benchmark model we restrict attention to two-…rm mergers, the resulting coalition structure C will be composed of at most three coalitions (T 2 f2; 3g) and each coalition will be composed of at most two …rms.
No-Merger Benchmark Cases
This section investigates the case where mergers cannot occur.
No price discrimination and no merger
Consider …rst the case where …rms cannot employ price discrimination strategies either because they have no information (e.g. consumers behave anonymously) or because price discrimination is not permitted. Here the model is reduced to two replications of the static model. Following a similar reasoning as in Chen and Zhang (2009), we can prove that a pure strategy equilibrium in prices fails to exist. 20 Although …rm i can always guarantee itself a pro…t equal to v merely focusing on its captive customers, the presence of a positive fraction of shoppers creates a tension between its incentives to price low, in order to attract them, and to price high, in order to extract rents from its captive customers. This tension results in an equilibrium displaying price dispersion. More speci…cally, there is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (henceforth, MSNE), the existence of which is proved by construction, as explained in what follows.
Suppose that a symmetric mixed strategy involves …rms charging a price no higher than p with probability F (p) with support [p min ; v] : If …rm i chooses price p while the other …rms use a mixed strategy, its expected pro…t is:
In equilibrium, …rm i must be indi¤erent between quoting any price that belongs to the equilibrium support, where
This yields:
2 0 A complete proof can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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Now, from the conditions which establish that F (p min ) = 0, it follows that p min = v + : In addition, in the two period game, overall expected pro…t for a representative …rm is equal to
It is then straightforward to obtain the next proposition.
Proposition 1.
In the no-merger and no-discrimination benchmark case, there is a symmetric subgame perfect MSNE where:
(i) each …rm chooses a price randomly from the distribution function
(ii) and each …rm's expected pro…t is equal to E ( ) = (1 + ) v :
Price discrimination with no merger
Consider now the case where price discrimination is permitted. As usual, we solve the game working backwards from the second period.
In a repeated purchase model, by collecting information about customers'past behaviour, a …rm might be able to learn whether a consumer is a captive or a shopper who bought from a rival before and to price accordingly. The lowest-price …rm in period 1 will sell both to the entire group of shoppers and to its captive consumers. Hence, it will learn nothing useful for price discrimination purposes and will set a single price in period 2. 21 In contrast, the …rms selling exclusively to their captive customers in period 1 will be able to recognize these "old"customers in the subsequent period. In particular, when a …rm realizes that part of its potential market (of size ) did not buy its good in period 1, it learns that it charged a high …rst-period price and that all of its …rst-period customers are captive. In sum, the high price …rms in period 1 become informed and so they can charge, in the subsequent period, one price for the recognized captive segment and another one for the rest of the market (consumers who are not recognized as being captive to the …rm).
For a given price p chosen by …rm i in period 1, …rm i is the lowest …rst-period price …rm (or the non-discriminating …rm in period 2) with a probability equal to
where F j (p) denotes the probability that …rm j's price is less than or equal to p in period 1. Firm i serves exclusively the segment of its captive customers in period 1 (and can, thus, engage in price discrimination in period 2) with a probability equal to 1 Y
With no loss of generality, suppose that in the …rst-period …rms 1 and 2 sell only to their segment of captive customers and become informed …rms. If price discrimination is permitted, …rms 1 and 2 will price discriminate accordingly in period 2. Let p o i and p r i denote the price set in the second period by …rm i (i = 1; 2) to its own captive customers and to the rival's previous (price sensitive) customers, respectively. Firm 3, on the other hand, being the lowest-price …rm in period 1, is uninformed and, therefore, will not be able to price discriminate in period 2.
Proposition 2. In a market with 3 …rms, there are 2 …rms that will be able to distinguish a shopper from a captive consumer and price discriminate accordingly in the second period of the game. Therefore:
(i) all captive consumers pay the monopoly price v whereas shoppers pay the marginal cost price;
(ii) price discrimination has no e¤ ect neither on second period pro…t nor on …rst-period price decisions.
This proposition highlights that moving from two …rms to three …rms makes a substantial qualitative di¤erence. 22 This is in sharp contrast with the results obtained in a duopoly model where just one …rm achieves the discriminating position in the second period, in which price discrimination boosts both …rms'second-period pro…t (see Chen and Zhang (2009) 
and Esteves (2009a)).
The reason why three …rms is a key number of …rms is that with three …rms there will be two …rms competing à la Bertrand (in the second period) for uncommitted customers. These …rms will then bid away their pro…ts from these shoppers in an attempt to attract them. 23 As a result, each discriminating …rm charges shoppers the marginal cost price and ends up making no additional pro…ts in this segment. The ability of the informed …rms to fully separate their captive customers from consumers that bought from a rival …rm before, together with the incapability of the other …rms to poach any of their captive customers, allows these informed …rms to charge their captive customers the reservation price v, without fearing any poaching attempt by the uninformed rival. Total second-period pro…t for a discriminating …rm is thus d = v :
Consumers remain anonymous to the non-discriminating …rm, which has no choice but to charge the same price to all consumers in period 2. Since the rival (informed) …rms set a price equal to marginal cost for all uncommitted buyers, the uninformed …rm's best response is to set the highest possible price v so as to extract the valuation of its captive customers. Total second-period pro…t for the non-discriminating …rm then equals nd = v : Consequently, all …rms earn the same pro…t in the second period of the game, regardless of whether they have achieved the discriminating position or not.
Remark 1 Absent the merger possibility, the ability to price discriminate does not lead to higher pro…ts.
Consider next the equilibrium …rst-period pricing. Firms make their pricing choices simultaneously and rationally anticipating how such decisions will a¤ect their pro…ts in the subsequent period. As second period pro…ts with discrimination are equal to second period pro…ts with no discrimination, price discrimination has no e¤ect on …rst-period pricing decisions. Therefore, in the price discrimination and no-merger scenario, there is a symmetric subgame perfect MSNE where in period 1 …rms behave as in Proposition 1. Each …rm chooses a price randomly from the distribution function F (p) (see equation (3)) and each …rm earns an overall pro…t equal to
Endogenous Mergers
The objective of this section is to investigate the interaction between (endogenous) merger decisions and information-based price discrimination.
When mergers are permitted in the beginning of the second period, i.e. before price competition takes place for the second time, a two-…rm merger may occur allowing the merging parties to join their customer-information databases. After …rst period decisions have been made, each consumer that bought from …rm i will have a record on …rm i's database. If …rms i and j decide to merge, they will join their databases. Starting from an initial market with three independent symmetric …rms, the model investigates which merger con…guration is likely to emerge in equilibrium. We assume that a merger to monopoly would not be permitted by competition authorities.
Mergers with no discrimination
Let us start by investigating a scenario in which a merger to duopoly is permitted while behaviour-based pricing practices are, for any reason, not allowed. Consider, for instance, the case where …rm 1 and 2 merge and sell their two goods (1 and 2) potentially at di¤erent prices.
This is not a form of price discrimination. In this case, the merging entity, say …rm M , secondperiod pricing strategy is to choose p k M where k = 1; 2. Firm 3 is the outsider …rm, say …rm O; and its pricing strategy is to choose p O :
In the post-merger game, the …rm that results from the merger is endowed with a database of locked in customers equal to 2 ( prefer good 1 and prefer good 2). The outsider …rm, on the other hand, has a group of locked in customers equal to : It is then straightforward to show that …rm M will price one of its products (for instance, product 1) at the monopoly price v and the other (product 2) will be sold at a price randomly chosen from the distribution function H (p). As …rms M and O compete for the segment of shoppers, this creates a tension between the …rms'incentives to price low, in order to attract them, and to price high, in order to extract rents from captive customers. This tension results in an equilibrium displaying price dispersion, as shown by the next proposition. Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 3 highlights that if price discrimination is not permitted, a merger has no e¤ect on each of the insiders'second period pro…t which is equal to v .
Remark 2
The merger itself without price discrimination does not lead to higher pro…ts.
Although a merger would allow …rms to join their customer databases, the merged entity cannot use these databases to boost its (second period) pro…ts. Thus, no …rm will embark on a merger in equilibrium if price discrimination is not permitted. Hence, each …rm will announce a singleton coalition, and so the resulting equilibrium coalition structure will be C = ff1g ; f2g ; f3gg. As mergers do not occur in the beginning of the second period, the …rst period game is similar to the benchmark case with no mergers and no discrimination. Consequently, in period 1, …rms behave again as in Proposition 1.
Mergers with price discrimination
Let us now analyze mergers when price discrimination based on purchase history is feasible. We are therefore assuming that price discrimination is legal, …rms have the required information to price discriminate and there is no arbitrage among consumers. Two scenarios are relevant. In the …rst scenario, two informed …rms are involved. This will be the case when a merger occurs between those two …rms that in period 1 gained the patronage of only their captive customers.
The merger of customer purchase histories will then allow the merged entity to distinguish an old (captive) customer from a shopper (who previously bought from a competitor). In the second scenario, even though, in the period 2, one of the merging …rms would be able to distinguish a captive consumer from an uncommitted one if it didn't embark on a merger, when it merges with an uninformed …rm, the merger of customer purchase databases will 'obfuscate'the merged entity in the sense that it will not be able to completely distinguish consumer types. An interesting point here is that the merger of customer databases will not always give the merged entity the required information to distinguish between all its captive customers and those consumers that might be induced to switch.
Second-period
Both merging …rms are informed Suppose …rst that the merger is between two …rms with information to distinguish whether a customer is a captive one or not. The outsider …rm (the lowest-price …rm in period 1) cannot distinguish between its captive customers and those willing to switch in the second period. When …rms 1 and 2 merge, the merger not only increases the merged …rm base of captive customers but also gives this merged …rm an information advantage over the outsider to the merger (the uninformed …rm 3). Following the same reasoning as in the previous section we will assume that the merging entity, …rm M; o¤ers two products. Clearly, the merged entity has more ‡exibility in its pricing strategy because the two products will have a price tailored at its old locked in customers (p o M ) and a potentially di¤erent one tailored at the shoppers who previously bought from a rival …rm (p r M ). As all the captive consumers have the same reservation price, then the two goods will be priced at the monopoly price (p o M = v) when the consumer is recognized as a price insensitive one. Thus, …rm M 's pro…t in this segment is equal to o M = 2v . The outsider …rm 3, on the other hand, cannot engage in price discrimination in period 2.
Look next at the second-period price competition for the segment of customers who might be willing to switch from the outsider, and let b p N denote the non-discriminating …rm's secondperiod price. 25 Proposition 4. There is no pure strategy equilibrium in prices for the group of consumers (shoppers) that bought from the outsider (non-discriminating) …rm in period 1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
There is, however, an asymmetric MSNE. Let G r M (b p N ) denote the probability that the merged …rm's price to the rival's previous customers is no higher than b p N and b G N (p r M ) denote the probability that the non-discriminating …rm's price is less than or equal to p r M :
Proposition 5. When the merged …rm can engage in price discrimination, whilst the outsider …rm cannot, price competition over the group of shoppers gives rise to an asymmetric
MSNE in which:
(i) The non-discriminating outsider …rm chooses a price randomly from the distribution
with support [b p N min ; v] and has a mass point at v with a density equal to m = + ; where
(ii) The discriminating-merged …rm chooses a price randomly from the distribution
(iii) The pro…t for the discriminating …rm from poached consumers equals
and the pro…t for the non-discriminating …rm equals b N = v :
Corollary 1. From the equilibrium distribution functions de…ned by (6) and (8) it follows
that:
; and (iii) m is decreasing in and increasing in :
In the equilibrium derived above, the outsider non-discriminating …rm uses a "Hi-Lo"pricing strategy. To squeeze more surplus from its captive customers, it charges the monopoly price v; with probability m; and to avoid being poached and loosing the group of customers willing to switch it quotes occasionally a low price. As expected, the shoppers face on average a higher price at the outsider non-discriminating …rm than at the merged discriminating …rm. As a result of the merger, the discriminating merged …rm has an advantage over its rival because it is able to entice the shoppers who bought from the rival before, without damaging the pro…t from its locked in segment. Conversely, the outsider …rm cannot protect all its …rst-period customers from price cuts. When it charges a low price, as a way to avoid poaching, it damages the pro…t from its captive segment. As the merged discriminating company has less to lose, it can be more aggressive. Therefore, regarding the price tailored for shoppers, it charges, on average, lower prices. Further, part (iii) states that the greater is the size of the outsider non-discriminating …rm's captive group , the higher is the probability of this …rm charging the monopoly price v and so the probability of poaching. The reverse happens with respect to the size of the switchable segment.
So, total second-period expected pro…t for each of the insider discriminating …rms, denoted
while the second-period pro…t for the outsider non-discriminating …rm is b N = v :
we have a measure of the (second period) bene…t of embarking on a merger when price discrimination is permitted. A merger between the two informed …rms has the strategic e¤ect of eliminating the competition between price discriminators for shoppers.
Thus, the pooling of the informed …rms' purchase history databases, through a merger, will improve the pro…tability of price discrimination and the value of each merger partner's database.
This will, in turn, promote the pro…tability of mergers. Now, contrasting the results in Proposition 1 and 5, one immediately sees that a merger between …rms with the required information to engage in behaviour-based pricing boosts the insiders'second period pro…t and has no impact on the outsider's second-period pro…t.
One merging …rm has information and the other does not In this scenario the merger of customer purchase databases will 'obfuscate'the merged entity which after the merger will not be able to distinguish all customer types. This will be the case when we have a merger between a …rm that in period 1 sold only to its captive customers and a …rm that in period 1 sold to both its captive customers and to shoppers. As before, with no loss of generality, suppose that in the …rst-period …rms 1 and 2 sell only to their captive customers. Firm 3 is the lowest-price …rm in period 1 and so serves its captive market as well as the shoppers. Suppose that we have a merger between …rms 1 and 3. In this case, after …rst period decisions have been disclosed, all of …rm 1's captive customers will have a record on …rm 1's purchase histories database. Similarly, all of …rm 3's captive customers as well as all the shoppers will have a record on …rm 3's customer database. Now, in the second period, by joining …rm 1's and …rm 3's databases, the merged …rm will only be able to recognize as being captive customers those that bought from …rm 1 before.
This means that the merged …rm can (in period 2) charge two prices, one price tailored to those customers recognized old captive to …rm 1 (p o M ) and another one to all those customers which have a record on …rm 3's database (e p M ). In contrast, the outsider …rm (in this case, …rm 2) will be able to distinguish a captive customer from a customer who bought from a rival before.
The outsider …rm will then charge, in period 2, two prices: one price targeted to its old captive customers (p o O ) and another one targeted to the shoppers previously buying from a rival …rm (p r O ).
As the merged …rm does not compete with the outsider …rm with regards to part of its captive customers (those consumers who bought from …rm 1 in period 1) it has no incentive to charge them anything other than the monopoly price. Therefore, the merged …rm will charge the customers recognized as captive customers the monopoly price, i.e., p o M = v: However, the merged …rm has no way to distinguish a captive customer from a shopper who previously bought from …rm 3. As a result, there is no pure strategy equilibrium in prices for the group of consumers that bought from the lowest-price …rm in period 1. There is, however, an asymmetric MSNE. Let G r O (e p M ) denote the probability that the outsider …rm's price to the rival's previous customers is no higher than e p M and e G M (p r O ) denote the probability that the merged …rm's price is less than or equal to p r O .
Proposition 6. Price competition over the group of consumers that bought from the lowestprice …rm in period 1 gives rise to an asymmetric MSNE in which:
(i) The merged …rm chooses a price randomly from the distribution
with support [e p M min ; v] : It has a mass point at v with density equal to e m = + ; where
(ii) The outsider …rm chooses a price randomly from the distribution
with support [e p M min ; v) :
(iii) The outsider …rm's pro…t from poached consumers equals
and the pro…t earned by the merged …rm with its non-recognized customers e M = v :
Note that, as for the second-period, the pro…t earned by the merged …rm is 2 M = 2v whereas the outsider …rm's pro…ts equals 2
This therefore suggests that when a merger of customer databases discloses partial information about a customer type, the merger will have no e¤ect on the insiders'second period pro…t (which would be equal to v ) but enhances the outsider …rm's pro…t.
Remark 3
Only the merger (involving informed …rms) and the possibility of engaging in BBPD lead to higher (insiders') pro…ts. Now, combining remarks 1, 2 and 3, one can conclude that a merger will only occur in equilibrium when: (i) price discrimination is permitted and (ii) the merger involves the two …rms with information to price discriminate in the post-merger game. 26 In other words, in a context wherein price discrimination is permitted, the equilibrium merger will involve the …rms with small market shares in the pre-merger game, i.e. those …rms selling exclusively to their captive customers in period 1.
As before and with no loss of generality, suppose that …rm 1 and 2 sold only to the segment of captive customers in period 1, meaning that they have the required information to recognize all types of customers in period 2. Formally, when price discrimination is permitted, …rms 1 and 2 will both announce f1; 2g, whereas the lowest …rst-period price …rm, …rm 3; will be indi¤erent between announcing a singleton coalition f3g and announcing f3; 1g or f3; 2g. Therefore, the resulting equilibrium coalition structure will be C = ff1; 2g ; 3g.Intuitively, as one …rm (…rm 1)
is handicapped in competition after the …rst period (it cannot price discriminate), this …rm is less valuable as a merger partner -only a merger between the two high priced …rms forecloses competition in the market structure induced by the merger.
First-Period
Consider next the equilibrium …rst-period pricing. Firms make their pricing choices simultaneously and rationally anticipating how such decisions will a¤ect both the merger game outcome and their pro…ts in the subsequent period. Again it is straightforward to show that there is no subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. There is, however, a MSNE, the existence of which is proved by construction. We have already seen that the …rm charging the lowest price in period 1 does not embark on a merger in equilibrium. Therefore, for a given price p i chosen by …rm i in period 1, …rm i is the lowest-price …rm in period 1 (or the non-discriminating outsider …rm in period 2) with a probability equal to
bility that …rm j's price in period 1 is less than or equal to p i : On the other hand, …rm i is one of the discriminating insider …rms in period 2 with a probability equal to 1 Y
Since we are looking for a symmetric MSNE, let F 1 j (p) = F 1 (p) for all …rms. Overall expected pro…t for …rm i when it charges …rst-period price p; uses a discount factor equal to ; and its competitors price according to F 1 (p) ; is equal to:
Equivalently,
Proposition 7. When price discrimination is permitted and a two-…rm merger occurs, there is a symmetric subgame perfect MSNE in which:
(i) Each …rm's …rst-period price is randomly chosen from the distribution
with minimum equilibrium price equal to
(ii) Each …rm earns expected overall equilibrium pro…ts equal to
Making use of equations (4) and (17) it follows that the merger possibility when price discrimination is feasible gives rise to a positive e¤ect on individual …rm's expected overall pro…ts:
Hence, our paper shows that a merger is pro…table only when price discrimination is possible. This result is due to the unilateral e¤ects of the merger, i.e., the strategic elimination of competition for shoppers between the two discriminating …rms. 27 
Competitive and welfare e¤ects
As the new HMGs suggest, when price discrimination is reasonably likely, the Agencies should evaluate the possible adverse competitive e¤ects from a merger. These new guidelines also suggest that the competitive e¤ects should be evaluated separately by type of targeted customer.
With this motivation in mind, in what follows we investigate the price e¤ects of mergers in our theoretical framework.
Look …rst at prices after the merger. The merged discriminating …rm raises (or at least does not reduce) the price to its captive consumers who will pay the monopoly price. In other words, consumers with a strong preference for the product of the merged …rms are expected to pay a higher price in the post-merger period. Regarding the price targeted to the segment of shoppers who previously bought from a rival, a comparison between F 1 and G r ; reveals that the …rst-period price is stochastically larger than p r . Hence, if poaching occurs, the group of shoppers will pay, on average, a lower second-period price. Finally, in what concerns the price charged to the group of the outsider's captive consumers the conclusion is less clear-cut. This …rm uses a "Hi-Lo" pricing strategy in period 2. With probability equal to m, its locked-in customers will pay the monopoly price. Otherwise, because it is not possible to establish a general stochastic order between F 1 and b G; this set of consumers may end up paying a higher or lower second-period price.
Look next at …rst-period prices when …rms anticipate the possibility of a merger when price discrimination is possible. From the equilibrium distribution functions it immediately follows that the e¤ect of a merger on …rst-period prices depends on whether price discrimination is permitted or not. Similarly, the e¤ect of price discrimination on …rst-period prices depends on whether a merger to duopoly can or cannot occur.
Corollary 2.
From the comparison between F and F 1 , it follows that F 1 …rst-order stochastically dominates F as long as > 0: Therefore, E(p 1 ) > E(p):
When price discrimination and mergers are permitted, a merger is pro…table for the insider …rms when all of them have information to engage in price discrimination. Consequently, the bene…t of embarking on a merger will give rise to strategic interactions in the pre-merger period.
Speci…cally, …rms will have a strategic incentive to raise …rst-period prices as a way to secure being one of the insider informed-discriminating …rms in the subsequent period. This acts to soften …rst-period price competition and to boost …rst-period prices. 28 Next we look at the welfare e¤ects of mergers with price discrimination. Without loss of generality, suppose that = 1: Although prices play no welfare role here-due to the unit demand assumption, no dropping out of consumers and no switching (or transport) costs-, price discrimination being permitted a¤ects the …rms'merger decisions and so their pro…ts and 2 8 Note also that regardless of price discrimination being permitted or not, the support of equilibrium prices is h v + ; v i when mergers are blocked. In contrast, the support of equilibrium prices is
i when both mergers and price discrimination are allowed. Since > 0; the minimum price is always higher when mergers and price discrimination are permitted. consumer welfare. Since production costs are assumed to be zero, total welfare (W ) is equal to the value of the good for all buyers that enter the market in both periods, that is W = 2v:
Due to the previous assumptions, a merger will have no e¤ect on overall welfare. Nevertheless, it is important to investigate separately the e¤ects of mergers on industry pro…t and consumer welfare.
To evaluate the pro…t and consumer surplus e¤ects of mergers, we …rst analyze the case where price discrimination is permitted and we move from the no-merger to the merger scenario. As welfare is constant, the e¤ect of a merger is to give rise to a transfer of income and wealth from individual consumers to the …rms. When …rms are not allowed to merge, it follows that industry pro…t is equal to N ind = 6v : This being the case, consumer surplus equals
When mergers are instead permitted, then, from equation (18), and recalling that = 1, we obtain that there is a positive net e¤ect on industry pro…t which equals
This gain is exactly compensated by a loss in terms of consumer surplus:
We can then state the following proposition.
Proposition 8. In a context where BBPD is possible, when a merger between informed players occurs, industry pro…t increases at the expense of consumer surplus.
This result is, therefore, in stark contrast with the general presumption of Chen (2005), according to whom "price discrimination by purchase history ... is by and large unlikely to raise signi…cant antitrust concerns. In fact, as the economics literature suggests, such pricing practices in oligopoly markets often intensify competition and potentially bene…t consumers."
(p. 123).
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In this section, we discuss what are the main policy implications for mergers that can be derived from our theoretical model. First, our model shows that when …rms are allowed to price discriminate, then the (unique) equilibrium merger reduces competition in such a way as to transfer wealth from customers to the merged …rm (and its competitors). This then suggests that if total welfare is the criterion adopted by the competition authorities to appraise a proposed merger, the merger is welfareneutral. Nonetheless, if consumer surplus is the competition authority welfare standard, as it is the case in most antitrust jurisdictions, then competition authorities should scrutinize with greater zeal mergers in industries wherein …rms are expected to engage in price discrimination practices.
Second, as far as prices after the merger are concerned, our analysis reveals that competitive e¤ects should be evaluated separately by type of targeted customer. In particular, we …nd that, in the post merger period, consumers with a strong preference for the merged entity products will be charged their reservation (monopoly) price. However, due to poaching activities, consumers in the segment of shoppers who bought from the merged …rm's competitor before will pay, on average, a price which is lower than the one they paid before the merger. Our model, therefore, gives a one possible theoretical rationale for the fact that, as the new HMGs emphasize, when price discrimination is feasible, a merger can give rise to adverse competitive e¤ects on targeted consumers. In so doing, it gives support to the new HMGs claiming that price discrimination should be a key factor in any competitive analysis of mergers.
Finally, the outsider's pro…t is shown not to be a¤ected by a merger when price discrimination (in the second period) is not feasible. In addition, also in a scenario in which price discrimination is permitted, the …rm which is excluded from participation in the equilibrium merger (the non-discriminating outsider …rm) is not a¤ected by the merger in terms of its second period pro…ts. This result then eliminates the so called (static) 'free-riding problem'identi…ed by the previous horizontal mergers literature regarding outsiders'pro…tability in the ex-post industry structure induced by the merger. However, it is important to highlight that, in our setting, BBPD creates instead a dynamic 'free-riding problem'via the race to embark on the (two-…rm)
merger. More speci…cally, our analysis reveals that in industries where BBPD and mergers are possible, the anticipation of the fact that the equilibrium merger will involve the …rms with the necessary information to price discriminate ex-post (i.e. those …rms that only served their captive customers before the merger) will lead all …rms in the industry to charge higher prices in the pre-merger market interaction. 29 Moreover, this competition softening e¤ect in turn enhances the overall equilibrium expected pro…t of all …rms in the status quo industry structure.
This being the case, and contrary to the results in the extant literature, our analysis discloses that in a context wherein BBPD is possible, the free-riding problem does not stem from strategic interactions among …rms post-merger, but from strategic interactions pre-merger. 30 This last result is of utmost importance for merger policy since it suggests that there might be scope for improving the rules currently used by competition agencies to investigate the potential anticompetitive e¤ects of horizontal mergers. In particular, our analysis reveals that the anticipated merger gives rise to …rst-period anti-competitive e¤ects and that part of the harm on consumers can be produced in the pre-merger period. Put it another way, at the time the merger is noti…ed to the relevant agency, 31 and (ii) an in depth evaluation of the potential risk that the likely adoption of post-merger price discrimination strategies might harm in a disproportional way certain consumers or groups of consumers in speci…c segments of the market (or submarkets).
Limitations of the model
In this section we discuss some important limitations of the proposed model.
Allowing for more than three …rms
The previous analysis focused attention on the e¤ects of a two-…rm merger in a setting where there are initially only three …rms in the industry. So, it is natural to wonder what would be the equilibrium outcome of the proposed game if one allows for more than three …rms in the status quo industry structure. Suppose now that there are N > 3 …rms in the industry. Each of these …rms is assumed to have a proportion of captive consumers, implying that now the number of shoppers is = 1 N > 0. If mergers cannot occur, it is straightforward to prove that each …rm's overall expected equilibrium pro…t equals E ( ) = (1 + ) v , irrespective of whether price discrimination is permitted or not.
In an online Appendix of this article, 32 we investigate which merger would occur in equilibrium when price discrimination is possible and N > 3. 33 More speci…cally, we carry out a technical analysis composed of two main steps that we brie ‡y describe in what follows.
First, we focus attention on the induced e¤ects of two-…rm mergers and …nd out that any such merger leaves at least two separate informed …rms and, therefore, has no e¤ect on insiders'
pro…ts. As in the baseline model, a two-…rm merger can involve either two informed …rms or one informed and one uninformed …rm. If any pair of informed …rms merge, then there will always exist at least one informed outsider. Hence, after the merger, Bertrand competition for shoppers between the merged entity and the informed outsider(s) will result in price equal to marginal cost for the shoppers. The same reasoning applies if instead an informed …rm merges with an uninformed one. So, any single merger involving only two of the N …rms in the status quo industry structure, where N > 3, will have no impact on the insider's equilibrium secondperiod pro…ts. Therefore, if only a single two-…rm merger is allowed, then no merger will occur in equilibrium. Note, however, that even though it seems reasonable to assume that a merger to monopoly would normally be prevented by antitrust authorities, as it is standard in the previous endogenous mergers literature (see, for instance, Fauli-Oller (2000), Horn and Persson (2001b) and Lommerud, Straume and SØrgard (2005)), there is no reason to assume that in a setting where there are more than three …rms in the initial industry structure only a two-…rm merger might occur. In practice, in situations where there are several …rms in the industry, it is often the case that mergers involve more than two …rms. This then motivates the second step of our formal analysis, that we discuss in turn.
Second, we study an extended version of our baseline model wherein even though the monopoly grand coalition cannot be formed, each …rm can announce any other subset of the …rms in the industry (including itself) that it wishes to form a coalition with. By so doing, we show that a situation wherein the subset of informed …rms embark on a merger between themselves, leaving outside the merger the uninformed …rm, constitutes the unique strong Nash equilibrium of the proposed coalition formation game. Put it another way, a merger between all informed …rms is pro…table and (if feasible) has the same qualitative e¤ect on …rst period pricing as the equilibrium two-…rm merger studied in our baseline model with three …rms. 34 
Information sharing
In section 7:1; we have shown that a merger (or a sequence of mergers) involving all …rms with the necessary information to price discriminate in the second period of the game is a pro…table strategy. As explained, the main role of the merger is to eliminate all competition for shoppers between the merging discriminating parties. By pooling the customer information databases of the two informed …rms, the merger increases the value of this information to each merger partner since the merger entity will then be able to fully separate di¤erent types of consumers and price discriminate accordingly. 35 This being the case, the following question can be raised: Couldn't the bene…t of customer recognition and price discrimination be realized by the less restrictive means of information exchange agreements between the …rms?
Notice that in our proposed theoretical framework (with three …rms) there is an important di¤erence between a merger and an information sharing agreement. In particular, if one of the informed …rms decides to enter an information exchange agreement with the other informed …rm (rather than embark on a merger involving the very same …rms), both of these …rms become fully informed about the identity of each customer but keep on being independent competitors in the product market. As a result, the pool of information through an information exchange agreement would not eliminate all competition for shoppers between the involved …rms: in equilibrium, each …rm would charge the marginal cost price to the shoppers and the reservation price v to its group of captive consumers.
In sum, information sharing between rival informed …rms only intensi…es competition in the price-sensitive consumers' segment of the market, where informed …rms will compete à la
Bertrand for shoppers, thereby being unable to earn any positive pro…t in this particular market segment. This in turn implies that informed …rms have no incentive to participate in a customer information sharing agreement in our setting, whereas by merging they might be able to reduce or even eliminate competition in speci…c segments of the market. Hence, our analysis suggests that competition authorities should not access mergers and information exchange agreements in the same way, and should be particularly concerned whenever they investigate mergers in industries wherein …rms are expected to engage in price discrimination.
Strategic consumers
So far, we have assumed that consumers are myopic (or naive). Relaxing this naivety assumption in our framework would imply assuming that consumers are highly sophisticated. In particular, apart from anticipating that …rms would engage in BBPD practices, consumers would also have to predict the outcome of the endogenous merger formation game that …rms play before competing in the marketplace for the second time. In what follows we brie ‡y discuss some of the implications of assuming instead that consumers are sophisticated. 36 A shopper has no incentive to behave strategically. In period 1, he must buy from the cheapest …rm. If he decided to buy from a high …rst-period price …rm, he would be recognized as a captive consumer in period 2 and, as a result, he would end up paying higher prices in both periods. On the other hand, if he decided to forgo a purchase in the …rst-period he would be recognized as a shopper. Therefore, he would pay the same price in period 2, but would forgo a positive surplus in period 1.
It only remains to see whether captive consumers have an incentive to forgo a purchase in order to avoid being recognized as captives in the subsequent period. Chen and Zhang (2009) account for this possibility by assuming that is the proportion of these captive consumers who have forgone a purchase in period 1. They show that in equilibrium none of these consumers has an incentive to forgo a purchase in the …rst period (i.e., = 0). Therefore, given the similarities between our model and that of Chen and Zhang (2009), we believe that the main qualitative results associated with an extended version of our model allowing for the existence of strategic consumers should be identical to those obtained in our baseline model.
Conclusion
The economics literature on oligopoly price discrimination by purchase history is relatively new and has focused mostly on markets with two symmetric …rms, where the possibility of horizontal mergers is not considered. In these situations, dynamic price discrimination by competing …rms often results in intensi…ed competition; and such pricing practices are typically believed not to raise antitrust concerns.
This article has taken a …rst step in investigating the impact of Behaviour-Based Price Discrimination (BBPD) in markets with more than two …rms where horizontal mergers may occur.
By so doing, we show that: (i) absent the merger possibility, the ability to price discriminate does not lead to higher pro…ts; (ii) the merger itself, without price discrimination, does not lead to higher pro…ts; and (iii) only the merger with price discrimination lead to an increase in profits, but at the expense of consumers'welfare. This then suggests that competition authorities should be particularly vigilant with regards to mergers in industries wherein …rms are expected to engage in BBPD.
Further, it is shown that in a scenario wherein price discrimination is feasible, the …rm which is excluded from the equilibrium merger is not a¤ected by the merger in terms of its ex-post merger pro…ts. This result, therefore, eliminates the so called (static) 'free-riding problem'
identi…ed by the previous literature on horizontal mergers. However, our analysis also discloses that BBPD creates a dynamic 'free-riding problem'. More speci…cally, in industries where BBPD and mergers are possible, the anticipation that the equilibrium merger will involve the …rms with the necessary information to price discriminate ex-post (i.e. those …rms that in the pre-merger market structure only sell to their captive customers) will induce all …rms in the industry to charge high prices in the pre-merger product market competition phase. Put it another way, because of the race between …rms in the industry to embark on the anticipated merger, there is a pre-merger competition softening e¤ect that will enhance the overall equilibrium expected pro…ts of all …rms in the status quo industry structure. This being the case, and contrary to the results in the extant literature, our analysis reveals that in a context wherein BBPD is possible, the free-riding problem does not stem from strategic interactions among …rms post-merger, but from strategic interactions pre-merger. This suggests that the anticipated merger gives rise to …rst-period anti-competitive e¤ects and that part of the harm on consumers can be produced in the pre-merger period.
An important implication for antitrust policy is then that merger enforcement should be sensitive to the role of price discrimination in particular industries and how consumer information used to price discriminate is shared and acquired by merging …rms. In particular, our analysis suggests that there might be scope for improving the rules currently used by competition agencies to investigate the potential anticompetitive e¤ects of horizontal mergers. The model suggests that when notifying parties are …rms with small market shares, it is very important to ensure that the strategic adoption of soft pricing strategies by the merging parties at an earlier stage is not the reason why their corresponding small market shares have emerged. Competition agencies should, therefore, complement the usual market share test with: (i) a detailed analysis of …rms pricing strategies before the merger; and (ii) an in depth evaluation of the potential risk that the likely adoption of post-merger price discrimination strategies might harm in a disproportional way certain consumers or groups of consumers in speci…c segments of the market (or submarkets). Proof of Proposition 7: The overall expected pro…t for …rm i; when it charges …rst-period price p i ; uses a discount factor equal to ; and their competitors charge a …rst-period price equal to p j according to F 1 j (p i ) ; is equal to:
i :
In MSNE the …rm must be indi¤erent between quoting the monopoly price v or any price in the equilibrium support. 
